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Cultures, Clashes and Peace
*
 
Ethnic and religious fractionalization have important effects on economic growth and 
development, but their role in internal violent conflicts has been found to be negligible and 
statistically insignificant. These findings have been invoked in refutation of the Huntington 
hypothesis, according to which differences of ethnic, religious and cultural identities are the 
ultimate determinants of conflict. However, fractionalization in all its demographic forms is 
endogenous in the long run. In this paper, we empirically investigate the impact of violent 
conflicts on ethno-religious fractionalization. The data involve 953 conflicts that took place in 
52 countries in Europe, Africa and the Middle East between 1400 CE and 1900 CE. Besides 
a variety of violent confrontations ranging from riots, revolts and power wars between secular 
sovereigns, the data cover religiously motivated confrontations. We document that countries 
in which Muslim on Christian wars unfolded more frequently are significantly more religiously 
homogenous today. In contrast, those places where Protestant versus Catholic 
confrontations occurred or Jewish pogroms took place are more fractionalized, both 
ethnically and religiously. And the longer were the duration of all such conflicts and violence, 
the less fractionalized countries are today. These results reveal that the demographic 
structure of countries in Europe, the Middle East and North Africa still bear the traces of a 
multitude of ecclesiastical and cultural clashes that occurred throughout the course of history. 
They also suggest that endogeneity could render the relationship between fractionalization 
and the propensity of internal conflict statistically insignificant. Finally, instrumenting for 
conflicts with some geographic attributes and accounting for the endogeneity of 
fractionalization with respect to ecclesiastical conflicts shows that religous fractionalization 
likely has negative effects on economic growth. 
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* We gratefully acknowledge Rachel McCleary’s detailed comments and critique although, as usual, all 
errors and speculations are ours alone. 1. Introduction
Religious and ethnic fractionalization play a prominent role in the empirical growth
and development literature and have been repeatedly shown to have a wide array of
eﬀects. In various studies, ethno-linguistic diﬀerences have been identiﬁed as having had
detrimental eﬀects on sociopolitical cohesion, thereby eroding the quality of institutions,
the commensurate government policies and long-run economic growth.1 Religious frac-
tionalization, in contrast, often exerts a positive if not always statistically signiﬁcant
eﬀect on economic growth, presumably because such fractionalization is an indicator of
sociopolitical tolerance and religious freedoms.2
While the economic literature has identiﬁed that fractionalization has an indirect
inﬂuence on economic development and growth, a host of papers has shown that the
standard measures of ethnic or religious fractionalization have a quantitatively and sta-
tistically negligible impact on the propensity of violent conﬂicts within countries.3 It is
on this basis that economists and political scientists have often refuted the ‘Hunting-
ton hypothesis’ whereby diﬀerences of ethnic, religious and cultural identities are the
ultimate determinants of conﬂict.4
The observed levels of fractionalization are clearly endogenous in the long run.
Thus, the standard approach to estimating the impact of fractionalization on institutional
quality and economic growth has involved maintaining time horizons that are long enough
to isolate the impact of fractionalization on economic outcomes, but are also short enough
that measures of fractionalization remain more or less constant. In practice, this strategy
has yielded studies that cover two or three decades. Still, the extent to which ethnic,
linguistic or religious fractionalization evolves and changes over time is subject to some
debate, although there is more of a consensus that religious fractionalization is the most
malleable and responsive to changes in the external environment.5
In this paper, we examine the long-run determinants of contemporary fractionaliza-
1Easterly and Levine (1997), Alesina et al. (1999, 2003), La Porta (et al., 1999) and Mauro (1995).
For a salient theoretical treatment, see Caselli and Coleman (2006).
2For further details, see Alesina et al. (2003).
3Fearon and Laitin (2003), Collier and Hoeﬄer (2005, 2007), Miguel et al. (2004) and Ray (2005).
4Huntington (1996).
5See, for instance, Alesina et al. (2003). A dissenting view is provided by Campos and Kuzeyev
(2007) who argue that ethnic fractionalization evolved more rapidly than linguistic and religious frac-
tionalization in 26 former communist countries over the period between 1989 and 2002.
1tion across countries along ethnic, linguistic and religious dimensions. We particularly
focus on the impact of violent confrontations over the course of medieval and post-
Industrial Revolution history on religious fractionalization in Europe, the Middle East,
the Near East and North Africa. Covering 953 violent confrontations that took place
in 52 countries in the aforementioned geographies over half a millennium between 1400
and 1900 CE, we document that the frequencies and types of conﬂict inﬂuenced con-
temporary levels of religious and to some extent ethnic and linguistic fractionalization
too.
For example, we ﬁnd that the frequency of Muslim on Christian wars within a
country’s borders is a statistically signiﬁcant and positive predictor of its current levels
of religious homogeneity; an additional incidence of violent conﬂict between Muslim and
Christian players within the borders of a modern country would have been suﬃcient to
lower its current level of religious fractionalization anywhere between 5 to 10 percent.
In contrast, Protestant and Catholic confrontations within each country between the
15th and 19th centuries–and to some extent the incidence of Jewish pogroms too–
helped produce more modern-day religious fractionalization, with an additional Catholic
on Protestant confrontation accounting for more than 15 percent higher religious frac-
tionalization. In addition, the longer was the duration of all such conﬂicts and violence,
the less fractionalized are countries now.
These results are robust to the inclusion of various control variables such as geo-
graphic region dummies, distance to the equator and population. For instance, we verify
that distance from the equator is a predictor of ethnic and religious fractionalization,
with equatorial distance reducing both. It is also the case that certain geographic re-
gions that are currently more fractionalized religiously and ethnically than others–such
as the Balkans and Eastern Europe–also typically have been historical buﬀer zones in
which religious conﬂicts between Muslims and Christians or Protestants and Catholics
were fought with higher frequen c ya sw e l la sl o n g e rd u r a t i o n .
Our conclusions are also robust to incorporating a much longer time lag than
one century between the measurements of fractionalization and conﬂict data. In fact,
if anything, the empirical results are strengthened using speciﬁcations in which 502
observations on violent conﬂicts that occurred between 1400 to 1600 CE are used as the
2basis of gauging the impact of historical conﬂicts on cross-country measures of religious
fractionalization at the turn of the 21st century.
These ﬁndings are relevant for assessing the Huntington hypothesis because they
demonstrate that the demographic structure of countries in Europe, the Middle East and
North Africa still bear the traces of a multitude of ‘ecclesiastical and cultural clashes’ that
occurred throughout the course of history. More speciﬁcally, those geographies where
clashes took place more often and with a longer duration between Muslim and Christian
‘civilizations’ are likely to be the areas that are more homogenous today. Whereas the
areas with a more frequent history of conﬂicts within the Judeo-Christian or Muslim ‘civ-
ilizations’ are more likely to be more heterogenous and fractionalized now. Accordingly,
modern-day fractionalization might simply be a manifestation of ethnic and religious
groups that have painfully learned to coexist. In contrast, a fairly homogenized coun-
try is likely to be a geography where the source of that homogeneity is a historically
persistent source of conﬂict that produced attrition and out-migration. Either way, the
likelihood of internal violence and conﬂict would be lower now, rendering the relation-
ship between fractionalization and the propensity of conﬂict within countries statistically
insigniﬁcant.
That ethnic, religious and linguistic cleavages within countries could be sources of
violent conﬂict and internal strife is by now part and parcel of the ubiquitous Huntington
hypothesis: “...conﬂicts occur between groups from diﬀerent civilizations within a state
and between groups which are... attempting to create new states out of the wreckage of
the old.” What is relatively obscure, however, is that Huntington himself was, at least
implicitly, cognizant of the attenuating eﬀects of conﬂicts in the long run:
“Many countries are divided in that the [ethnic, racial and religious] diﬀer-
ences and conﬂicts among these groups play an important role in the politics
of the country. The depth of this division usually varies over time. Deep
divisions within a country can lead to massive violence or threaten the coun-
try’s existence. This latter threat and movements for autonomy or separation
are most likely to arise when cultural diﬀerences coincide with diﬀerences in
geographic location. If culture and geography do not coincide, they may be
made to coincide through either genocide or forced migration,” Huntington
3(1993, p. 137, 208).
Given that the economics literature has long linked the institutional quality of
countries and their sociopolitical as well as economic stability to various forms of frac-
tionalization, a salient issue is whether conﬂicts and religious confrontations have a direct
impact on institutions and political systems, or if the impact of violence and religious
confrontations solely ﬁlters through fractionalization.6 While our analysis conﬁrms that
ethnic and linguistic fractionalization has a detrimental impact on institutions and the
quality of polities across countries, there indeed exists a direct and statistically signiﬁ-
cant impact of the history of violent conﬂicts–especially those of a religious nature–on
institutions and polities.
The fact that fractionalization is shown to evolve over time and the empirical work
below incorporates time lags of anywhere from one to four centuries between the con-
ﬂict data and fractionalization observations ought to be suﬃcient to isolate the impact
of the former on the latter. But in interpreting empirical work on the relationship be-
tween fractionalization and economic outcomes, the conventional inclination is to explore
the potential channels of adverse impact via the role of fractionalization in generating
conﬂict. From this perspective, the direction of causality that we advocate here runs
counter to such traditional approaches. Be that as it may, it is important to acknowl-
edge that, if historical trends did exist over the very long periods we consider here, they
were in the direction of generating higher fractionalization, not less.7 As we shall soon
elaborate, given our main results–especially those involving the Muslim versus Chris-
tian confrontations–such a channel of reverse causality would produce an attenuation
bias. This is on account of the fact the argument of reverse causality establishes a pos-
itive eﬀect, which runs from higher fractionalization to more frequent conﬂicts and vio-
lence. But in a variety of cases–most notably, regarding the impact of Muslim-Christian
confrontations–we ﬁnd a negative impact of violent conﬂicts on fractionalization.
Furthermore, as we shall document in Section 3, the historical evidence suggests
6For the role of social divisions and fractionalization on stability and institutions, see Alesina, Baqir
and Easterly (1999), Easterly and Levine (1997), Knack and Keefer (1995).
7Direct supporting evidence for the long term evolution of fractionalization is hard to come by.
But for the medium term evolutions of ethnic, religious and linguistic fractionalization following the
disintegration of authoritarian socialist regimes, see Campos and Kuzeyev (2007).
4that there were fundamental changes in the degree of religious and ethnic fractionalization
of the speciﬁc geographies we study below during the last century, let alone the ﬁve
centuries preceding it. In the Middle East, Europe, the Near East and parts of northern
Africa, which are subject to our analysis, medieval history reveals that religious pluralism
came mostly on the back of violent confrontations either due to international political
and religious rivalries or as a result of domestic religious splinters.8 This is all in the
way of arguing that, while fractionalization may be an accurate and signiﬁcant predictor
of social and political conﬂicts in the short and the medium runs, fractionalization was
inﬂuenced by violent confrontations in the very long run.
All the same, violent ecclesiastical confrontations are plausibly endogenous too,
and it is possible that the historical patterns of ecclesiastical conﬂicts were shaped by
proximity–or lack thereof–to geographic regions that have been pivotal for Judaism,
Christianity and Islam, such as Jerusalem, Mecca and Rome. In that case, countries’
distance to these ecclesiastical centers could be used as instruments based on the premise
that spread and contractions of Judaism, Christianity and Islam historically were pre-
dominantly driven by conﬂicts, so as to make religious, ethnic and even linguistic frac-
tionalization functions of ecclesiastical conﬂict but not distance to the ecclesiastically-
pivotal cities. In this spirit, we ran 3-stage least squares IV regressions, in which we ﬁrst
regressed ecclesiastical conﬂicts on distance to ecclesiastical centers, we then estimated
the impact of conﬂicts on fractionalization, and we subsequently identiﬁed the impact
of fractionalization on average economic growth rates. Doing so revealed a negative
and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of religious, ethnic and linguistic fractionalization on
economic growth.
2. Some Related Literature
In addition to the literatures referenced above, the work below relates to other strands in
the economics of religion and political economy. First, diﬀerences of religion have been
documented as important instigators of violent conﬂict. As Richardson (1960) has shown,
diﬀerences of Christianity and Islam, have been causes of wars and that, to a weaker
extent, “Christianity incited war between its adherents.” Similarly, Wilkinson (1980)
has claimed that “the propensity of any two groups to ﬁght increases as the diﬀerences
8Iyigun (2008a, b).
5between them (in language, religion, race, and cultural style) increase.” And the more
recent political science literature has supplied the view that religion and ethnicity are two
fundamental components of ‘culture capital’, the diﬀerences in which that can produce
wholesale ‘clash of civilizations’.9
The corollary of such ﬁndings were in fact articulated earlier by the likes of Mon-
tesquieu, Kant and Angell. Their ‘liberal peace’ view emphasized that “mutual economic
interdependence could be a conduit of peace.” Along these lines, Jha (2008) ﬁnds some
evidence of the view that diﬀerences in the degree to which Hindus and Muslims could
provide complementary, non-replicable services in the medieval maritime ports of India
explain the extent to which religious tolerance could be sustained over the long term. In
particular, he shows that medieval trading ports were 25 percent less likely to experience
a religious riot between 1850-1950, two centuries after Europeans eliminated Muslim ad-
vantages in trade. In a similar vein, Clingingsmith et al. (forthcoming) document that
the Muslim pilgrimage of Hajj increases observance of global Islamic practices while de-
creasing antipathy toward non-Muslims. Their evidence suggests that such changes are
due to the interactions among Hajjis from around the world during the Holy Pilgrimage.
Second, we have the political economy literature that incorporates conﬂict and
appropriation into models of production. Haavelmo (1954) was the ﬁrst to articulate the
notion that appropriation and violent conﬂi c to v e rt h eo w n e r s h i pf o rr e s o u r c e ss h o u l d
be modeled as an alternative to economic production. Later contributions, such as
Hirshleifer (1991), Grossman (1994), Grossman and Kim (1995), Grossman and Iyigun
(1995, 1997), Skaperdas (1992, 2005), Alesina and Spolaore (2007) and Hafer (2006),
built on Haavelmo’s original ideas. The work below sits at the junction of these two
strands since it is based on the premise that religious, ethnic or more broadly cultural
diﬀerences could be driven by conﬂict and war.
There is also an active related strand in the economics of religion. Some papers in
this line focus on the supply side, emphasizing how religious norms and denominations
evolve (e.g., Barro and McCleary, 2005, Berman, 2000, Ekelund et al., 1996, Ekelund et
al., 2002, Iannaccone, 1992). Other papers, in contrast, discuss the demand side (Glaeser
9The culture capital view of religion has been advocated by, among others, Huntington (1996), Landes
(1998), Ingelhart and Baker (2000).
6and Sacerdote, 2003, Inglehart and Baker, 2000).
Yet another cluster of work on the economics of religion explores how adherence to
diﬀerent faiths, such as Judaism, Islam or diﬀerent denominations of Christianity, might
have inﬂuenced individual behavior and the evolution of sociopolitical institutions (e.g.,
Greif, 1993, 1994, 2006, Kuran, 2004a, 2005, Becker and Woessmann, 2009, Botticini and
Eckstein, 2005, 2007, Glaeser, 2005, Lewis, 2002, Guiso et al., 2003, 2006, Abramitzky,
2008 and Iyigun, 2007, 2008a, 2008b). More generally, this strand falls within the rubric
of the economics of culture which advocates the importance of cultural diﬀerences in
various economic outcomes (Landes, 1998, Temin, 1997, Fernandez et al., 2004, Fernan-
dez, 2007). The work below relates to this strand because it examines the longer-term
demographic ramiﬁcations of conﬂicts related to or driven by religious motives.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 3, we review the
historical background. In Section 4, we present the baseline ﬁndings. In Section 5,
we discuss issues of endogeneity as well as robustness, and present some alternative
speciﬁcations. In Section 6, we conclude.
3. Historical Background
Our measures of religious and ethnic fractionalization do not extend back in time for
us to control for the dynamics of fractionalization historically. As we have noted above,
however, there is somewhat of a consensus that religious fractionalization is more respon-
sive to the external environment than either ethnic or linguistic fractionalization. In any
case, we shall now provide some evidence that the geographic areas in the current domain
of the 52 countries in our study were most likely to have been uniformly homogenous
throughout the 16th century–if not until much later–than they are today.
To start with, consider Europe, the Middle East and North Africa at the turn
of the 15th century. At the time, Christianity had been split for close to three and
a half centuries along its eastern Orthodox and Roman Catholic denominations. And
the Nestorian as well as the Coptic Churches had already split from Rome close to a
millennium prior to 1400 CE. However, there was little if any geographic overlap in
the domain of each of these Christian denominations at the turn of the 15th century.
Moreover, while the precedents for the Protestant Reformation had been set in western,
northern and central Europe with the Cathar/Albigensian uprisings in 1177 CE as well
7as the Waldensian movement in the same year, Europe west of the Balkan peninsula was
quite a homogenous ecclesiastical block within the domain–and under the monopoly–
of the Roman Catholic Church. (see Moore, 1994, and Rhodes, 2005). In England, it
was not until 1534 that fractionalization began in earnest with the Church of England
separating from the Roman Catholic Church during the reign of Henry VIII.10
I nt h ee a s t ,t h eO t t o m a ne m p i r eh a dm a d es i g n i ﬁcant territorial gains in the late
14th century, yielding the geographic areas within what is now Bulgaria, Romania and
most of eastern Greece to Ottoman control. The Ottomans followed the traditional
Islamic policy of religious tolerance toward the other ‘people of the book’. Jews, Chris-
tians and other believers of the one true God had the right of protection of their lives,
properties and religious freedoms provided that they accepted Ottoman rule and paid
the special head tax, cizye. Hence, there is not much on record to suggest that a large
number of Balkan Christians converted to Islam, with only some small minority groups,
s u c ha st h eB o g o m i l so fB o s n i a ,w h oh a db e e np e r s e c u t e du n d e rC h r i s t i a nr u l e ,h a v i n g
chosen to do so (Shaw, 1976, p. 19). Nor was there any signiﬁcant amount of resettle-
ment by the Ottoman Muslims within the newly-acquired eastern European territories.
While the Balkans are currently one of the most religiously fractionalized geographic
regions covered in our study, there is much to suggest that this fractionalization was
fairly low and bounded by our contemporary standards throughout the 16th and the
17th centuries.11
At the turn of the 16th century, Spain looked like a most homogenous Catholic
country. Of course, that was on account of the Spanish Inquisition, under which Monarchs
Isabella I of Castile and Ferdinand II of Aragon had begun in 1478 to purge the Iberian
peninsula of all religions and Christian denominations except Roman Catholicism. While
the inquisition did not oﬃcially end until 1834 when Isabel II abolished it, the Muslims
and Jews of the peninsula as well as its Christians of rival denominations had relocated
10MacCulloch (2003, pp. 193, 194).
11Along these lines, there is clear consensus that the Ottomans’ deliberate policies of low taxes and
religious toleration generally helped to augment religious and ethnic diversity of the Balkans and eastern
Europe (Kafadar, 1996, Shaw, 1976, and Karpat, 1974, Faroqhi, 2004, pp. 37 and 64).
It is well known that the Ottomans were directly involved in aiding the relocation of Huguenots from
France to Moldavia, then an Ottoman territory. The Ottomans also indirectly supported the Serbian
Orthodox immigrants againts the Hapsburgs in some Balkan protectorates.
8out of the peninsula entirely by the early 16th century.12
All in all, the geographic areas we cover in this paper were much more homogenous
religiously, ethnically and linguistically in the 16th century, and even the 17th century.
There were two primary reasons for this: (i) The Protestant Reformation hadn’t yet oc-
curred and most splinter movements within Christianity had to remain underground until
late-16th century to mid-17th century, when Protestantism was oﬃcially recognized by
the Roman Catholic Church. (ii) The Balkans started to come under Ottoman inﬂuence
in the early 15th century, but the Ottoman control of the peninsula was not complete
until much later in the early-16th century. Thus, even though the Balkans started to
became religiously and ethnically fractionalized relatively early on, they were fairly ho-
mogenous throughout the 16th century and even much later due to the Ottomans’ ﬁscal
policies and the decentralized nature of their authority. Moreover, those regions that
were most fractionalized at that time included the Balkans as well as northern and west-
ern Europe, which are the regions that are still some of the most fractionalized today
(more on which below).
In this context, one also needs to bear in mind that fractionalization data are
driven, to some signiﬁcant extent, by the political regimes in eﬀect. In more repressive
regimes, the measured fractionalization rates are more likely to be lower than the actual
measures.13 Hence, the fact that the time period and geographic areas we investigate
were unambiguously much less democratic and typically much more repressive prior to
1900 and most certainly before 1600 also suggests more homogeneity back in time.
4. The Empirical Analysis
4.1. Data and Descriptive Statistics
The primary data source of violent conﬂicts is the Conﬂict Catalog by Brecke (1999).
It is a comprehensive dataset on violent conﬂicts in all regions of the world between
1400 CE and the present. It contains a listing of all recorded violent conﬂicts with a
Richardson’s magnitude 1.5 or higher that occurred on ﬁve continents.14 These data are
12Landes (1998, p. 139).
13Alesina et al. (2003).
14Brecke uses the deﬁnition of violent conﬂicts supplied by Cioﬃ-Revilla (1996): “An occurrence of
purposive and lethal violence among 2+ social groups pursuing conﬂicting political goals that results in
fatalities, with at least one belligerent group organized under the command of authoritative leadership.
9still under construction, but they are virtually complete for Europe, North Africa and
the Near East. We rely on this portion.
For each conﬂict recorded in the catalog, the primary information covers (i) the
number and identities of the parties involved in the conﬂict; (ii) the common name for
the confrontation (if it exists); and (iii) the date(s) of the conﬂict. On the basis of these
data, there also exists derivative information on the duration of the conﬂict and the
number of fatalities, but the latter are only available for less than a third of the sample.
We worked with two cuts of this dataset: one, which covered the ﬁve centuries be-
tween 1400 and 1900 CE, and another that spanned the two hundred years between 1400
and 1600 CE. The broader, half a millennium cut yielded a total of 953 conﬂicts, while
the narrower dataset resulted in 502 observations. We then identiﬁed the geographic lo-
cations of each of these conﬂicts and assigned them to one of the 52 countries that exist
today in Europe, the Middle East, the Near East or North Africa.15 Then we augmented
this dataset with the fractionalization data constructed by Alesina et al. (2003). For
some other peripheral data, such as population measures, polity and democracy scores
and city distance calculations, we relied on McEvedy and Jones (1978), the Polity IV
Project and City Distance Tool by Geobytes.16
Our ﬁnal data processing step involved classifying conﬂicts by the actors involved.
If a violent conﬂict pitted a predominantly Muslim society against a Christian one (i.e.,
the Ottomans versus the Hapsburgs at various occasions during the 16th and 17th cen-
turies or the Russo-Circassian wars between 1832 and 1864), we labeled that conﬂict
as one involving Muslims against Christians; if it involved coreligionist groups (such as
the Napoleonic wars in Europe or Russia in the 19th century or the Ottomans against
The state does not have to be an actor. Data can include massacres of unarmed civilians or territorial
conﬂicts between warlords.”
Richardson’s index corresponds to 32 or more deaths (log32 = 1.5) and the ﬁve continents covered
are all those that are inhabitable (i.e., Europe, Asia, the Americas, Australia, and Africa).
15To be speciﬁc, we ﬁrst identiﬁed the theater(s) of conﬂict for each of the observations in the Brecke
dataset using multiple sources, including, but not limited to Oxford Atlas of World History (2002), the
Rand McNally Historical Atlas of the World (2005), the Encyclopedia Britannica, Levy (1983) and Shaw
(1976). Then, we identiﬁed the longitude and latitude of each of the battle or conﬂict locations. We
used that information to tally the diﬀerent kinds of conﬂicts and violent confrontations that occurred
between 1400 and 1900 CE within the borders of the 52 countries in our sample.
16The Polity IV data can be accessed at http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm and the
city distance calculator can be found at http://www.geobytes.com/CityDistanceTool.htm.
10the Safavids or Memluks in the 16th century), then we classiﬁed them as Christian ver-
sus Christian or Muslim versus Muslim. And for those conﬂicts which explicitly had
a religious dimension (such as the various Protestant or Huguenot revolts against the
Catholic establishment in Europe during the 14th, 15th or 16th centuries and various
Jewish pogroms that occurred in Europe dating back to the 11th century), we classiﬁed
them as Catholic-Protestant confrontations or pogroms.17
Table 1 lists the key underlying data and Table 2 presents some descriptive sta-
tistics. As shown in the ﬁrst table, countries that are most religiously fractionalized
today include the Eastern European and Balkan countries, such as Bosnia & Herzegov-
ina, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Hungary and Moldova. Interestingly, this is more or less
the set of countries that lay in the buﬀer zone between Christianity and Islam, as de-
ﬁned by Huntington.18 There are other highly fractionalized countries located in western
and central Europe also, such as the Netherlands, Switzerland, Germany and the United
Kingdom, as well as others in the Middle East, such as Jordan and Lebanon. By contrast,
those countries that are religiously most homogenous typically have Muslim majorities,
such as Algeria, Tunisia, Turkey and Yemen.
While there are ap r i o r ireasons to think that the interactions of people with dif-
ferent ethnic or religious backgrounds might have been more frequent in the buﬀer zones,
they do not necessarily suggest the higher frequency of ethnic and religious interactions
produced a positive or negative net impact on fractionalization in the buﬀer territories.
On the one hand, it could have been that minority religions were either exterminated or
17Of course, there are various other ﬁner or broader classiﬁcation criteria we could employ. For
example, among Muslim versus Muslim conﬂicts, we could distinguish those confrontations that occurred
between the Shi’a versus the Sunni. Or, within Christianity, we could identify those confrontations which
pitted eastern Orthodox groups against Catholic societies. In the work below, we have chosen to focus
instead on categories of conﬂict that had higher frequency or relatively more signiﬁcance historically,
but broadening the scope of our conﬂict types remains an area of future investigation.
18Huntington (1996, p.159) provides an explicit map of the buﬀer between the ‘Christian’ and ‘Muslim’
civilizations. It is roughly deﬁned by a North-South axis which eﬀectively splits the European continent
from Asia, running “along what are now the borders between Finland and Russia and the Baltic states
(Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) and Russia, through western Belarus, through Ukraine separating the Uni-
ate west from the Orthodox east, through Romania between Transylvania with its Catholic Hungarian
population and the rest of the country, and through former Yugoslavia along the border separating
Slovenia and Croatia from the other republics. In the Balkans, of course, this line coincides with the
historical division between the Austria-Hungarian and Ottoman empires.”
In what follows, we shall abide by this demarkation.
11forced to convert with more frequency by societies which subscribed to majority religions
in the buﬀer zones, thereby leading to forced conversion to the monotheistic religion or
to a syncretized form of religion (sects) that were marginally tolerated by the dominant
religion. Such dynamics would have produced more religious homogeneity in the buﬀer
zones. On the other hand, buﬀer zones could have been areas with more religious porous-
ness, especially if the more intense nature of ecclesiastical competition in the buﬀer zones
enabled more proselytizing and voluntary conversions. In that case, religious diversity
would have been higher in the buﬀer zones. For all these reasons, it is incumbent upon
us to acknowledge–and, in what follows, explicitly control for–the special nature of the
buﬀer zones in the dynamics of ethnic and religious fractionalization.
In terms of the patterns of warfare and conﬂict, we see that Austria, France, Ger-
many, Italy, Poland, Russia, Spain and Turkey were the theaters of conﬂi c tm o s to f t e n .
Adjusting for country size, some of those countries remain high on the list, although
the incidence of violent conﬂicts in Germany, Russia and Turkey adjusted for their geo-
graphic size is relatively low. Of the 52 countries in the sample, predominantly eastern
E u r o p e a na n dB a l k a nc o u n t r i e s ,s u c ha sA l b a n ia, Greece, Austria, Bulgaria, Turkey and
Ukraine, saw the most Muslim on Christian conﬂicts. But in Spain and Russia too there
were relatively more conﬂicts which pitted Muslim against Christian players. And in
six of the countries in the sample, including France, Germany and Switzerland, there
were violent confrontations between Protestants and Catholics. Although not shown,
our data also cover four countries–Belarus, France, Portugal and Spain–where one or
more pogroms took place between 1400 and 1900 CE. Figure 1 is replicated from Iyi-
gun, Nunn and Qian (in progress); it shows the conﬂicts in our dataset by century and
geographic location.
[Table 1 and Figure 1 about here.]
Now some salient descriptive data statistics. First, note that countries are more
religiously fractionalized than they are ethnically or linguistically. At the same time,
there is also a higher level of cross-country variance in religious fractionalization. There
were close to 18.3c o n ﬂicts within each country in the sample over the 500-year interval
between 1400 and 1900 CE. Among these conﬂicts, there were on average 3.3 violent
12confrontations per country that involved Muslim and Christian sides, about .73 which
pitted Catholics against Protestants and .096 of Jewish pogroms per country. Catholic
on Protestant conﬂicts lasted much longer on average than those between Muslims and
C h r i s t i a n sw h i c hi nt u r nl a s t e dm u c hl o n g e rt h a nJ e w i s hp o g r o m sa n do t h e rt y p e so f
violent confrontations. Conditional on the fact that there was at least one such type
of confrontation within country borders over the interval between 1400 and 1900 CE, a
typical Protestant versus Catholic conﬂict lasted more than 3.5 years, whereas Muslim
on Christian conﬂicts lasted roughly three years and Jewish pogroms on average did not
even last half a year.
Using our longer timespan covering the period between 1400 and 1900 CE, the
average year of conﬂicts was 1644, with Muslim on Christian wars occurring on average
around the year 1626 and Jewish pogroms being dated around the year 1500 CE. By
contrast, when we restrict the time coverage to the two-century interval between 1400
and 1600 CE, those dates are respectively revised as 1512, 1547 and 1451 CE.
Finally, note that there is a positive but relatively low level of positive correla-
tion between religious fractionalization and the two other fractionalization measures,
although that between religious and linguistic fractionalization is the higher of the two
measures. By contrast, the correlation between ethnic and linguistic fractionalization is
still positive but much higher. Religious fractionalization exhibits a negative and rela-
tively low correlation with Christian on Muslim conﬂicts, but it shows a positive and
modest correlation with Protestant and Catholic wars and a low positive correlation
with Jewish pogroms. The correlation of religious fractionalization with the duration
of diﬀerent kinds of conﬂict varies too, with the correlation of religious fractionaliza-
tion and the duration of Muslim versus Christian conﬂicts being the only one which is
slightly negative. As shown in the second panel of Table 2, the geographic correlations of
the religious fractionalization measure conﬁrm that the Balkans and Eastern Europe are
highly fractionalized whereas the Middle East is not. In our ﬁnal panel in Table 2, we
document that all three measures of fractionalization rise with distance from the equa-
tor, although ethnic fractionalization does so by a much smaller magnitude. Countries
in which a majority of the population is Christian (Muslim) are religiously more (less)
fractionalized, reﬂecting in part the higher (lower) extent of denominational plurality
13within Christianity (Islam).
[Table 2 about here.]
4.2. Main Results
In our baseline estimates, we cover the period 1400 through to 1900 CE and estimate
the following regression equation:
FRACi = λ0 + λ1TOTALCONFLICTS
λ2MUSLIMCHRISTIANWARSi + λ3PROTESTANTCATHOLICWARSi
+ λ4POGROM i + λ5DURCONFLICTSi (1)
+ λ6DURMUSLIMCHRISTi + λ7DURPROTESTCATHi
+ λ8DURPOGROMi + λ9Xi + εi,
where FRAC i is one of three alternative dependent variables constructed by Alesina et
al. (2003); TOTALCONFLICTS i is the total number of violent confrontations that oc-
curred within country i’s borders between 1400 CE and 1900 CE; MUSLIMCHRISTI—
ANWARSi is the count of violent confrontations between Muslims and Christians which
took place in country i over the relevant time span; PROTESTANTCATHOLICWARSi
is the count of violent conﬂicts between Catholics and Protestants that occurred in coun-
try i between 1400 CE to 1900 CE; POGROM i is the number of Jewish pogroms which
took place in country i during the same period; and DURCONFLICTSi, DURMUS
– LIMCHRISTi, DURPROTESTCATHi, DURPOGROMi denote the average du-
ration of the types of conﬂict we deﬁned above, respectively.19
19For complete details of how the various fractionalization measures are deﬁned and calculated, see
Alesina et al. (2003).
14In our most parsimonious empirical speciﬁcations, the set of control variables Xi in-
cludes nine geographic dummy variables, WESTERNEU, CENTRALEU, EASTERN
— EU, NORTHERNEU, BALKANS, AFRICA, ASIA, MIDEAST and ISLAND.
Note that, taken together, two of those geographic dummies, EASTERNEU and BAL
– KANS,d e ﬁne what turned out to be the historical buﬀer zone between Christian
and Muslim societies. In other more comprehensive estimates, we also include in Xi the
population level of i in 1994, POPULATION; the distance from the equator of country
i’s capital, EQUATOR;ad u m m yf o rw h e t h e ro rn o ti is landlocked, LANDLOCK;
country i’s land area in km2, LANDAREA; the population estimates for 1000 CE and
1500 CE, POP1000 and POP1500, respectively; the distance of country i’s capital from
the three ecclesiastical centers of Rome, Jerusalem and Mecca, ROME, JERUSALEM,
and MECCA; dummies for whether a majority of the population was a Christian or
Muslim majority in 1994, CHRISTIANMAJOR and MUSLIMAJOR; and the years
during which each of the four types of conﬂict took place on average, YRCONFLICT,
YR MUSL IMCHR IST, YR PR OTESTCA THand YR POG R OM.
Table 3 displays results from four regressions that employ religious fractionalization
as the dependent variable.20 Column (1) shows results from the most parsimonious of
regressions, with controls only for geographic region as part of Xi. As mentioned earlier,
certain areas of Europe tend to be more homogeneous than others, hence the addition of
geographic dummies controls for regional diﬀerences. Column (2) adds a control for land
area, LANDAREA, which is reported, though not signiﬁcant, a dummy for whether the
country is landlocked, LANDLOCK, and current population, POPULATION,i nc a s e
fractionalization is correlated with population size.21 Column (2) also adds variables
for distance to the equator and a dummy for whether a country is landlocked. Column
(3) builds on the speciﬁcation in (2) with the additional variables of distance to major
religious centers of Mecca, Rome and Jerusalem, as well as a dummies for whether the
country had a Muslim or Christian majority in 1994, and its population in the years 1000
20In all results shown, we report the heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors.
21It is important to control for country size to the extent that country formation is endogenous
and causality runs from violent confrontations to country size, which in turn aﬀects our measures of
fractionalization. Put diﬀerently, to the extent that the impact of conﬂicts on fractionalization arises
from endogenous country formation, controlling for LANDAREA could help to limit omitted variable
biases.
15and 1500 CE. Of these, only the religious majority coeﬃcients are reported.22 Column
(4) adds variables associated with the average year of the conﬂi c tb o t hi ng e n e r a la n db y
the types of religious conﬂict, although they are not reported. All in all, these additional
control variables are highly correlated with duration and do not appear to have a large
eﬀe c to nm a g n i t u d eo rs i g n i ﬁcance of the variables in question.
In all four regressions in Table 3, religious fractionalization depends negatively
and statistically signiﬁcantly on the frequency of Muslim on Christian wars and typically
positively–though not signiﬁcantly–on wars between Protestants and Catholics. These
results buoy the thesis that the long-run incidence and patterns of religious conﬂicts–in
this case, those between Muslims and Christians, in particular–did impact the contem-
poraneous extent of religious fractionalization within countries. The role of historical
conﬂicts in inﬂuencing modern-era fractionalization is quite large. In the simplest re-
gression in Table 3, for instance, one more violent incident in which Muslims fought
against Christians is associated with close to ﬁve percent less religious fractionalization,
or a generally more homogenous religious community some 400 years later.23 The result
increases in magnitude as controls are introduced and remains statistically signiﬁcant.
Additionally, we see that the duration of Muslim versus Christian conﬂicts enters neg-
atively, decreasing fractionalization by 6 to 9 percent depending on the speciﬁcation,
though reaching statistical signiﬁcance only in column (2). The frequency of Jewish
pogroms is also associated with increased religious fractionalization, although the mag-
nitude and signiﬁcance varies by speciﬁcation. However, the duration of pogroms is
associated with decreased fractionalization.
While these baseline results show a pattern that will remain at the fore the rest
of the way, they also invite the question of why Muslim on Christian conﬂicts had an
opposite impact than those between Protestants and Catholics or, for that matter, the
incidence of Jewish pogroms in a region. There is no clear cut answer to this. A plausible
conjecture is that the types of conﬂict in question also diﬀer from one another in the
extent to which the underlying sources of conﬂict have been mitigated or resolved in the
22The coeﬃcients not shown typically are statistically insigniﬁcant, with occasionally alternating signs
across the diﬀerent empirical speciﬁcations.
23The coeﬃcient of MUSLIMCHRISTIAN in the column (1) estimate of Table 3 is −.016. Given
that the average fractionalization rate is .369 in our sample, this corresponds to a 4.3p e r c e n tl o w e r
fractionalization rate due to one extra conﬂict between Muslims and Christians.
16course of time–however, superﬁcially or fundamentally that may be.
In particular, the process through which the Protestant and Catholic Christian de-
nominations came to terms with their underlying diﬀerences was arduous and prolonged.
The seeds of this confrontation lay in centuries past and the ‘heretical’ movements of Lol-
lardy, Huguenots and Hussites. The confrontation spanned more than 130 years between
the oﬃcial inauguration of the Reformation in 1517, ran through the 1555 Peace of Augs-
burg, when the Holy Roman Empire oﬃcially recognized the Lutheranism, culminated
with the Treaty of Westphalia signed at the end of the Thirty Years War in 1648, which
marked the oﬃcial recognition of Protestantism by the Roman Catholic Church. When
this fundamental ecclesiastical disagreement was eventually settled, religious pluralism
within Christianity started to become the accepted European norm. Such acceptance
and coexistence began to deﬁne, to some extent, the relationship between Christianity
and Judaism too, especially in Europe, though this took until the end of the Second
World War.
In contrast, one ought to bear in mind that the era that we are investigating co-
incides with a period when both Christianity and Islam had been established long ago,
but the competition between them had once again intensiﬁed with the Ottomans’ domi-
n a t i o no fe a s t e r nE u r o p ei nt h e1 5 t ha n d1 6 t hc e n t u r i e sa n dt h eSpanish Reconquista in
1492. And, as we alluded to in our introduction, the One God-One True Religion dual-
ity inherent in all three major monotheisms has historically been an important factor in
sustaining violent encounters between Muslim and Christian societies. Hence, these dif-
ferences may be at the core of why the diﬀerent types of conﬂicts and violence inﬂuenced
diﬀerently modern-day religious fractionalization across countries.
The fact that the duration of Jewish pogroms depressed religious fractionalization,
whereas their incidence stimulated it is also puzzling. However, it is important to point
out that the impact of duration is conditional on the incidence of pogroms and vice
versa. Hence, what we are picking up might be the inﬂuence of a history of sustained
suppression driving religious homogeneity. Moreover, it is also important to note that the
fractionalization measures are self-reported. A country with a history of religious repres-
sion may also have encouraged Judaism to go underground by making it unacceptable
17to report being Jewish, thus leading to increased homogeneity.24 Pogroms that lasted
longer might have exerted more inﬂuence or simply encouraged out-migration and thus
increased homogeneity.25 On the ﬂi ps i d e ,p o g r o m sc o u l dh a v ei n v o k e dt h es a m es o r t
of mechanism as conﬂicts within Christian sects discussed above, magnifying internal
diﬀerences and subsequently resulting in increased religious fractionalization.
Finally, it is worthwhile to remark that, with the exception of some of the geo-
graphic dummy variables that come in statistically signiﬁcant, although not robustly
to changes of empirical speciﬁcation, only a few of the right-hand side variables, which
we singled out above, have explanatory power. Despite this observation, the ﬁto ft h e
regressions, even of the baseline version, is quite high as indicated by the R2 measures.
[Table 3 about here.]
Tables 4 and 5 employ the same speciﬁcations shown in the previous table but with
ethnic and linguistic fractionalization, respectively, as the dependent variables. Though
the direction of the eﬀect of religious conﬂicts on fractionalization is generally main-
tained, the impact of the latter on ethnic and linguistic fractionalization is overwhelm-
ingly insigniﬁcant statistically. This stands in stark contrast to the results we reported
in Table 3. One exception is provided by the statistically signiﬁcant and negative impact
of the duration of Muslim on Christian wars on ethnic fragmentation in columns (1), (2)
and the negative and signiﬁcant role of pogroms on ethnic fractionalization in column
(2) of Table 4. Interestingly, the coeﬃcient on the frequency of total confrontations,
TOTALCONFLICTS, now enters negatively in ﬁve of the eight speciﬁcations in Ta-
bles 4 and 5, with three of the ﬁve also being statistically signiﬁcant. In particular, the
24As it is well known, this was certainly the case in the Iberian peninsula after 1492, but sporadically
even before that.
In fact, starting in the 9th century, the Spanish Reconquista began to take shape with the Christian
kingdoms up north pushing the frontiers southward into Muslim-held lands. By mid-13th century,
Christian kingdoms had regained back most of the peninsula. Although the adherents of the three
Abrahamic traditions coexisted on the peninsula rather peacefully by medieval standards even after the
Reconquista began, there were on occasion ﬂare ups, such as the movement of the Cordoban Martyrs,
a group of al-Andalus Christians “who provoked and achieved martyrdom at Muslim hands in the
ninth-century Cordoba,” (Constable, 2006, p. 307).
25A large number of the Sephardim resettled in the Ottoman Empire during the reign of Sultan Beyazid
II (r. 1481-1512) who dispatched the Ottoman navy for their transfer. The number of Sephardic Jews
who were resettled in various parts of the still-ﬂedgling Ottoman empire – in particular, in Salonica,
Avlona, Palestine and Istanbul – is estimated to have totaled 100,000 (Kumrular, 2008, p.24).
18dampening inﬂuence of TOTALCONFLICT on ethnic fractionalization in column (1)
of Table 4 and its similarly negative impact on linguistic fractionalization in columns (1)
and (2) of Table 5 contrast with the insigniﬁcant role of conﬂicts generally in religious
fractionalization.
As shown in Tables 4 and 5, little else provides an evidently strong predictor of
either ethnic or linguistic fractionalization. As discussed above, our data reﬂect a higher
degree of religious fractionalization than eithere t h n i co rl i n g u i s t i c .T h u s ,t h el o w e rl e v e l s
and variance of ethnic and linguistic fractionalization might in part account for our results
not being as strong as those reported in Table 3. Still, the eﬀects of our explanatory
variables on ethnic fractionalization present slightly stronger and more uniform results
over various speciﬁcations than linguistic fractionalization. This should again be viewed
in light of the fact that our data reﬂect less linguistic fractionalization than ethnically.
All in all, the weaker power of our set of right-hand side variables in explaining either
ethnic or linguistic fractionalization vis-a-vis religious fractionalization is manifested in
the ﬁt of the speciﬁcations as summarized by the R2 measures in Tables 4 and 5.
[Tables 4 and 5 about here.]
4.3. Alternative Speciﬁcations & Robustness
Now we can turn to issues of robustness and a discussion of various alternative speciﬁ-
cations.
First and foremost, and as we alluded to in our introduction, there is rightly a
question of causality. That is, whether or not the long-run history of ecclesiastical
conﬂicts had a bearing on religious, ethnic and linguistic homogeneity, or whether our
results are merely reﬂective of a reverse causality channel through which we are picking
up the eﬀects of persistent levels of fractionalization on the propensities of varies sorts
of conﬂict. In this, we are encouraged by numerous factors already discussed herein,
including the fact that, with very few exceptions, the European continent presented
relatively low levels of fractionalization in the medieval period. Moreover, the addition
of regional controls should account for outliers such as the Balkans and the Iberian
Peninsula before 1492, which represented some of the geographies with above-average
fractionalization.
19All the same, we decided to rerun our empirical tests using a three hundred-year
time lag between our fractionalization observations and the conﬂict data. In particular,
instead of tracking the patterns, types and attributes of violent confrontations over the
half millennium between 1400 to 1900 CE, we generated an alternative variant of the
conﬂi c tv a r i a b l e sw h i c hw a sb a s e do nd a t ac o v e r i n gt h et w oc e n t u r i e sb e t w e e n1 4 0 0a n d
1600 CE. This yielded 502 total conﬂicts in the 52 countries in our sample–instead of
the 953 over the 500-year interval.26
Tables 6, 7, and 8 provide the results derived using this new sample but other-
wise replicating the empirical speciﬁcations shown in Tables 3, 4 and 5, respectively.
By incorporating a longer time lag examining only the period covering the two-century
s p a nb e t w e e n1 4 0 0t o1 6 0 0C E ,w es e ei nT a b l e6t h a tt h ee ﬀect of wars on religious
fractionalization are very much in line with–and in some cases, in fact, stronger–than
using the entire period 1400 to 1900 CE. Not only are the R2 measures comparable if
not better than those shown in Table 3, but the three types of ecclesiastical conﬂict mea-
sures, MUSLIMCHRISTIAN, PROTESTCATHOLIC and POGROM,a r es t a t i s -
tically signiﬁcant in nine out of 12 times and directionally always consistent with Table
3r e s u l t s : 27 Muslim on Christian confrontations that took place between the 15th and
17th centuries depressed the current-day religious fractionalization of countries, although
only in the column (4) regression does the coeﬃcient on MUSLIMCHRISTIAN attain
signiﬁcance at the 10 percent level. By contrast, the Protestant on Catholic conﬂicts or
Jewish pogroms that took place four centuries ago or earlier raised religious fractional-
ization, entering the four speciﬁcations always positively and statistically signiﬁcantly.
While other control variables are typically insigniﬁcant, the geographic dummies
for the Middle East, eastern Europe and the Balkans in some speciﬁcations are signiﬁ-
cant. And in terms of the duration of conﬂicts we again have some evidence that longer
religious conﬂicts–in this case, DURPOGROM only–typically reduced religious ho-
mogeneity. In terms of quantitative eﬀects, the results we obtain with this longer-lag data
are still stronger: in column (4) for instance, a ten percent higher incidence of Muslim
26We also examined our main ﬁndings using data for the period between 1400 and 1700 CE. Since
those data yielded results that are analogous to the oned we discuss here, we have chosen not to report
them.
27For contrast, consider that MUSLIMCHRISTIAN, PROTESTCATHOLIC and POGROM,
are statistically signiﬁcant in only ﬁve out of 12 speciﬁcations in Table 3.
20on Christian wars is associated with close to a ten percent decrease in religious frac-
tionalization, the magnitude of which is larger than the range implied by the regressions
c o v e r i n gt h ee n t i r e1 4 0 0t o1 9 0 0C Et i m ep e r i o d .
[Table 6 about here.]
In Tables 7 and 8 we report the estimates in which ethnic and linguistic fraction-
alization are deﬁned as the dependent variables, respectively. The results using only the
p e r i o d1 4 0 0t o1 6 0 0C Ee x h i b i ts i m i l a rt e n d e n c i e st ot h o s ew h e r et h ee n t i r ep e r i o dw a si n
use. In particular, our conﬂict data aren’t as powerful as they are in explaining ethnic or
linguistic fractionalization as they are in religious fractionalization. However, the results
shown in Tables 7 and 8 are still much stronger than those reported in Tables 4 and 5. In
particular, TOTALCONFLICTS has a depressing eﬀect in one speciﬁcation with eth-
nic fractionalization as the dependent variable and it has such an eﬀect in two regressions
where linguistic fractionalization is the dependent variable. This is in clear contrast to
the results with religious fractionalization ,w h i c hd on o ty i e l da n ye x p l a n a t o r yp o w e rt o
the overall level of conﬂicts in fractionalization. The one signiﬁcant diﬀerence between
the results shown in Tables 7 and 8 vis-a-vis those reported in 4 and 5 is that POGROM
has a statistically signiﬁcant, positive impact on ethnic and linguistic fractionalization
in seven of the eight speciﬁcations, whereas DURPOGROM has a negative and sta-
tistically signiﬁcant impact on ethnic and linguistic fractionalization in 6 of the eight
regressions shown. This eﬀect is in line with those on religious fractionalization reported
in Tables 3 and 6, but they are in strong contrast with those in Tables 4 and 5 where
the impact of conﬂicts over the longer time horizon of 1400 to 1900 CE on ethnic and
linguistic fractionalization is shown to be typically insigniﬁcant.28
[Tables 7 and 8 about here.]
A four-century lag between measures of conﬂict and fractionalization provides us
some comfort that we are distilling oﬀ any impact fractionalization could have on con-
ﬂicts. Nonetheless, even a four century lag would not compensate for omitted variable
28Although none of the results discussed here control for it, we also ran our key regressions with the
error terms being clustered on the basis of the nine geographic regions. Doing so weakened some of the
coeﬃcients on MUSLIMCHRISTIANWARS and made some coeﬃcients statistically insigniﬁcant,
but the qualitative nature of our results did not change radically.
21biases inherent in the results above. This is why we controlled for the dates of indepen-
dence in some alternative estimates and substituted more or less aggregated geographic
controls for countries in Europe in various other regressions. Neither of these alter-
ations inﬂuenced the essence of our main ﬁndings. Furthermore, for an empirical work
whose key explanatory data cover the medieval era, our R2 measures are unusually high,
exceeding .76 in some speciﬁcations where religious fractionalization is the dependent
variable. This is another reason why omitted variable biases are probably not exerting
a meaningful bias in the key results.
Of course, employing IV estimates could serve as a compelling alternative to length-
ening our time lags or considering diﬀerent sets of control variables. Here, we are
somewhat handicapped due to the lack of viable instrumental variables: most avail-
able instruments for conﬂicts are plausible determinants of ethnic, religious or linguistic
fractionalization too. However, the variousm e a s u r e so fd i s t a n c ef r o mJ e r u s a l e m ,R o m e
and Mecca could serve as instruments for religious conﬂict, to the extent that (i) the
historical patterns of ecclesiastical conﬂicts were shaped by proximity–or lack thereof–
to geographic regions that have been pivotal for Judaism, Christianity and Islam; and
(ii) the spread and contractions of Judaism, Christianity and Islam historically were
predominantly driven by conﬂicts instead of peaceful proselytizing, so as to make reli-
gious, ethnic and even linguistic fractionalization functions of ecclesiastical conﬂict but
not distance to the ecclesiastically-important cities.
With this possibility in mind, we estimated a 3-stage least squares IV regression.
In the ﬁrst stage of our 3-stage least squares IV estimation, we regressed MUSLIM –
CHRISTIANWARS and PROTESTANTCATHOLICWARS on JERUSALEM,
ROME, MECCA, the two- and three-way interactions among those three distance mea-
s u r e sa sw e l la st h ed u m m i e sEASTERNEU and BALKANS, which together deﬁne
the buﬀer zone between eastern Europe and the near East. In the second stage, we then
estimated the impact of MUSLIMCHRISTIANWARS and PROTESTANTCATH
– OLICWARS on fractionalization. And in the ﬁnal stage, we regressed average eco-
nomic growth rates over the period between 1970 and 2002 on fractionalization.29
29Another limitation of this strategy is due to limited sample size: many of the east European, near
Asian and Balkan countries in our sample became independent of the Iron Curtain in the early-1990s.
Hence, economic growth data averaged over a relatively meaningful (read: long enough) time interval is
22Our results are summarized in Tables 9.A through 9.C. As shown in the ﬁnal panel
of 9.C, all the distance measures help predict the propensity of conﬂict between Chris-
tians and Muslims. As summarized in 9.B, PROTESTANTCATHOLICWARS in
particular, but MUSLIMCHRISTIANWARS too, have predictive power in estimat-
ing religious and ethnic fractionalization. And as Table 9.A shows, religious fractional-
ization, as instrumented with our conﬂict variables cum ecclesiastical distance measures,
exerts a statistically signiﬁcant and negative eﬀect in two regressions, attaining a p-value
of 11 percent in the third. This seems to be the case with ethnic fractionalization too,
with the coeﬃcient estimate for it generating a statistically signiﬁcant negative impact
in the two estimates ethnic fractionalization is included as a determinant of economic
growth. As shown in the ﬁnal column, however, linguistic fractionalization yields a sta-
tistically insigniﬁcant eﬀect when all fractionalization measures are included, although
all three variables yield negative coeﬃcients.30 On the one hand, these results verify
that ethnic fractionalization is detrimental to long-run economic growth. On the other
hand, they stand in contrast to those in the existing literature that have either not been
able to establish a link between religious fractionalization a n de c o n o m i cg r o w t ho rf o u n d
religious fractionalization having a positive eﬀect on it.
[Tables 9.A through 9.C about here.]
As a ﬁnal line of inquiry, what can we say about the role of the longer-term his-
tory of violent conﬂicts on development indirectly through their impact on institutions?
As we alluded to in our introduction, there is a strand in the empirical development
literature which has shown that ethnic and linguistic fractionalization has detrimental
available for only 30 of the 52 countries in the original sample.
30The ﬁrst-stage F-statistics for MUSLIMCHRISTIANWARS a r eh i g he n o u g ht h a tw eh a v en o
reason to suspect our ecclesiastical distance measures to be weak instruments for Muslim versus Christian
wars. The same is not true for PROTESTANTCATHOLICWARS,w i t hi t sﬁrst-stage F-statistics
being less than unity in all three estimates.
In any case, to verift the strength of our instruments, we experimented with conditional
likelihood ratio (CLR)c o n ﬁdence intervals for two separate 2SLS speciﬁcations in which
MUSLIMCHRISTIANWARS and PROTESTANTCATHOLICWARS were, in turn, instru-
mented for in the ﬁrst stage and religious fractionalizati o nw a sr e g r e s s e do ne i t h e ro ft h et w oc o n ﬂict
measures in the second. Those tests yielded bounded and directionally consistent (i.e., negative) inter-
vals for Muslim on Christian wars. Moreover, the Sargan test p-values indicated that our instruments
satisfy the over-identifying restrictions.
23eﬀects on economic growth and development, but only indirectly. Since our results thus
far illustrated that the history of religious conﬂicts especially had eﬀects on modern-
era cross-country diﬀerences in fractionalization, we believe it is incumbent upon us to
examine if conﬂicts alone can help to explain diﬀerences in institutional quality.
Table 10 reports our ﬁndings with countries’ polity scores as measured with the
POLITY data is the dependent variable, which is regressed on the standard explanatory
variables that we employed as the determinants of fractionalization. As shown, we pickup
a strong impact of the history of conﬂicts over the period between 1400 to 1900 CE
on the quality of polities in 1994.31 Speciﬁcally, whereas the incidence of Muslim on
Christian conﬂicts had a dampening eﬀect on religious fractionalization, it is shown to
have had positive and, in three of the four speciﬁcations, statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects
on polities. In contrast, the incidence of pogroms yields negative and in two of the four
regressions statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects on polity scores. The duration of the three
types of religious violence typically produced statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects on polities,
although the directional impact of conﬂict duration was ambiguous, especially in the
cases of DURPROTESTCATH and DURPOGROM. In the next section, we will
have more to say on this topic.
[Table 10 about here.]
5. Discussion
The results above show that the long-term history of violent conﬂicts, in general, and
those of a religious nature, in particular, had a bearing on the contemporary diﬀer-
ences of cross-country religious fractionalization. They suggest that violent conﬂicts and
religious confrontations inﬂuenced ethnic and linguistic fractionalization too, although
to a much lesser extent. Furthermore, religious conﬂicts seem to have exerted statisti-
cally signiﬁcant–in some cases adverse but in others favorable–eﬀects on institutional
quality, as measured by countries’ polity scores.
The existing literature on the subject has long established a generally robust ad-
verse impact of fractionalization on measures of institutional quality. In fact, although
31Running the same regressions with the 1400 to 1600 CE conﬂict data and the four century lag
instead of one century produced very similar, if not stronger, results. All results discussed but not
shown are, of course, available upon request.
24we have chosen not to present them here for the sake of brevity, estimating the analogs
of the regressions in Table 10, but replacing all of the various conﬂict measures which
we controlled for thus far with the three alternative fractionalization measures, we too
were able to verify the statistically signiﬁcant, detrimental eﬀects of ethnic and linguistic
fractionalization, in particular, on polity scores.
Taken together with the results we have presented thus far, these ﬁndings raise an
intriguing question: If fractionalization is inﬂuenced in part by violent conﬂicts and reli-
gious confrontations, which, together with fractionalization, then have a bearing on the
cross-country diﬀerences in the quality of polities, do violence and religious confronta-
tions have a direct role in POLITY or do their eﬀects ﬁlter only indirectly through
fractionalization?
Given the data at hand, this is a question to which we can provide some an-
swers. In Table 11 we summarize some of our related ﬁndings.32 Interestingly, when we
include the three measures of fractionalization along with the standard list of conﬂict
variables we relied on in the previous tables, we ﬁnd that neither religious nor linguistic
fractionalization impacts cross-country diﬀerences in institutional quality, as proxied by
polity scores. But depending on the speciﬁcation, some conﬂict measures continue to
exert statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects on POLITY. For instance, the frequency of Mus-
lim on Christian violent conﬂicts has positive coeﬃcients in all four speciﬁcations and
it is statistically signiﬁcant in column (2) at the 5 percent level. Moreover, although
its coeﬃcient estimates aren’t signiﬁcant in the other regressions, the estimate of the
MUSLIMCHRISTIAN coeﬃcient yield a p-value of 16 in columns (3). These results
are perfectly in line with–albeit somewhat weaker–than those reported in Table 10.33
[Table 11 about here.]
There are at least two not necessarily mutually exclusive observations we can make
on this basis. One, the very long-run histories of conﬂict, in general, and those that are of
32These results were produced using conﬂict data covering the period between 1400 and 1900 CE, but
an exercise in which we used data for the 1400 to 1600 CE interval instead generated qualitatively quite
similar ﬁndings. Hence, we chose not to report them here.
33To see if violent conﬂicts impacted a narrower measure of polity, we ran regressions similar to the
one we discuss here, using the democracy index score as the dependent variable instead. Doing so we
generally found conﬂicts to have insigniﬁcant eﬀects on democracy.
25an ecclesiastical nature, in particular, had some long-lasting and direct eﬀects on cross-
country diﬀerences in institutional quality. Two, the long-standing standard arguments
as well as ﬁndings that fractionalization impacts institutions seem to be sensitive to
w h e t h e ro rn o tt h ed i r e c te ﬀects of the history of violence on institutions are controlled
for. As all our earlier results attest, however, this is not tantamount to concluding
that various types of fractionalization have no impact on the evolution of institutions,
although they do indeed suggest that fractionalization is endogenous.
If conﬂicts and religiously motivated or sustained confrontations do help to explain
the cross-country variations in the quality of polities and the extent of fractionalization,
then what factors inﬂuence the historical patterns of conﬂict? Besides some of the
literature referenced above that puts a premium on cultural diﬀerences as a determinant
of violent conﬂicts historically as well as the 3SLS IV estimates we reviewed above, some
other inﬂuential contributions, such as Tilly (1992), have at least implicitly emphasized
the role of technological change and geography. This is an area of ongoing investigation
which we pursue in Iyigun, Nunn and Qian (in progress).
Next, in interpreting our ﬁndings, it is important to bear in mind that our data
cover the history of a limited geographic area extending from Europe, the Middle East,
the near East to the Arabian peninsula and North Africa; they cover neither sub-Saharan
Africa, Far East Asia nor the Americas. Thus, while our geographic coverage pertains to
the regions of the world in which major ecclesiastical dynamics and interactions unfolded
historically, one would have to be cautious in the external validity of these conclusions
both in time and space.
We can ﬁnally wrap the paper up with the implications of our ﬁndings for the role
of ethno-religious fractionalization and divisions in civil wars and internal conﬂict. We
have shown that the long-run historical record and patterns of violent conﬂict inﬂuenced
the current levels of ethnic and religious fractionalization. We have, in fact, identiﬁed
that the modern-era levels of religious fractio n a l i z a t i o ni np a r t i c u l a rd e p e n do nt h et y p e
of conﬂicts that occurred in a given region. On that basis, then, it is possible that
the contemporary levels of fractionalization are low due to the fact that the underlying
historical sources of conﬂict have still not been resolved. Or, conversely, fractionalization
might be high now precisely because the sources of conﬂict have been settled over the
26course of history.
6. Conclusion
A sizable literature has shown that fractionalization inﬂuences economic development
and growth indirectly, without yielding any evidence that the standard measures of ethnic
or religious fractionalization have a quantitatively and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on
violent conﬂict within countries.
In this paper, we examined the long-run determinants of contemporary fractional-
ization across countries along the ethnic, linguistic and religious dimensions. Relying on
some novel data that cover 953 violent confrontations which took place in 52 countries
over the period between 1400 and 1900 CE, we identiﬁed that the frequencies and types
of conﬂict inﬂuenced contemporary levels of religious and to some extent ethnic frac-
tionalization too. Speciﬁcally, we have demonstrated that the frequency of Muslim on
Christian wars within a country’s borders is a statistically signiﬁcant and positive pre-
dictor of its current levels of religious homogeneity. By contrast, Protestant and Catholic
confrontations within each country between the 15th and 19th centuries–and to some
extent the incidence of Jewish pogroms too–produced more religious fractionalization
today. And the longer were the duration of all such conﬂicts and violence, the less frac-
tionalized countries are now. We have also established that these results are robust to
the inclusion of various control variables.
In sum, the contemporary cross-country variations in religious heterogeneity reﬂect
the history and type of ecclesiastical conﬂicts within countries. Those geographies where
clashes took place more often and with a longer duration between Muslim and Christian
‘civilizations’ are likely to be the areas that are more homogenous today. Whereas the
areas with a more frequent history of conﬂicts within the Judeo-Christian or Muslim
‘civilizations’ are more likely to be more heterogenous and fractionalized now. It is this
sort of endogeneity that would render the relationship between fractionalization and the
propensity of internal conﬂict statistically insigniﬁcant. Whether or not Huntington’s
thesis is an accurate description of the future will continue to be debated and ﬁercely
contested. All the same, our ﬁndings show that the demographic structure of countries
in Europe, the Middle East and North Africa do reﬂect the eﬀects of a multitude of
ecclesiastical and cultural clashes that occurred throughout the course of history.
27Finally, once we accounted for the endogeneity of fractionalization with respect to
ecclesiastical conﬂicts, we found that religious fractionalization, if anything, negatively
eﬀects on economic growth.
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1 Afghanistan .2717 2 0 0 Asia
2 Albania .4719 8 8 0 Balkans
3 Algeria .0091 6 5 0 N. Africa
4 Armenia .4576 2 2 0 Asia
5 Austria .4146 32 8 0 East EU
6 Azarbeijan .4899 2 1 0 Asia
7 Belarus .6116 4 0 0 East EU
8 Belgium .2127 16 0 0 West EU
9 Bosnia & Her .6851 10 6 0 Balkans
10 Bulgaria .5965 8 6 0 Balkans
11 Croatia .4447 7 3 0 Balkans
12 Cyprus .3962 3 1 0 M. East
13 Czech Rep. .6591 16 1 4 East EU
14 Denmark .2333 12 0 0 North EU
15 Egypt .1979 7 1 0 N. Africa
16 Estonia .4895 5 0 0 North EU
17 Finland .2531 3 0 0 North EU
18 France .4029 97 0 14 West EU
19 Gaza Strip .0342 1 0 0 M. East
20 Georgia .6543 9 1 0 Asia
21 Germany .6571 40 0 7 Central EU
22 Greece .1530 29 26 0 Balkans
23 Hungary .5244 12 3 0 East EU
24 Iran .1152 16 3 0 M. East
25 Iraq .4844 5 0 0 M. East
26 Ireland .1550 16 0 6 North EU
27 Israel .3469 1 1 0 M. East
28 Italy .3027 93 1 0 Central EU
29 Latvia .5556 3 0 0 North EU
30 Lebanon .7886 1 0 0 M. East
31 Libya .0570 2 2 0 N. Africa













33 Luxembourg .0911 1 0 0 Central EU
34 Malta .1223 3 3 0 Central EU
35 Moldova .5603 4 4 0 East EU
36 Netherlands .7222 16 0 0 West EU
37 Oman .4322 8 4 0 M. East
38 Poland .1712 48 7 0 East EU
39 Portugal .1438 19 0 0 West EU
40 Romania .2373 24 15 0 Balkans
41 Russia .4398 92 25 0 East EU
42 Saudi Ara .1270 5 1 0 M. East
43 Slovakia .5655 6 1 0 East EU
44 Spain .4514 54 7 0 West EU
45 Sweden .2342 28 0 1 North EU
46 Switzerland .6083 23 0 3 Central EU
47 Syria .4310 9 0 0 M. East
48 Tunisia .0104 3 2 0 N. Africa
49 Turkey .0049 44 11 0 M. East
50 Ukraine .6157 23 13 0 East EU
51 United Kgm .6944 64 0 3 North EU
52 Yemen .0023 5 2 0 M. East
Source: Religious fractionalization data, column (1) are from Alesina et al. (2003). The total
number of violent conﬂicts, Muslim versus Christian and Protestant-Catholic confrontations
reported in columns (2), (3) and (4),respectively are from Brecke (1999).
36Figure 1: Conﬂitcs by Century and Country
Source: Iyigun, Nunn and Qian (in progress).Table 2: Descriptive Statistics and the Correlation Matrix
1400 CE — 1900 CE The Correlation Matrix
n =5 2 Mean St. Dev. RELIG ETHN LING AV GC MSCHR CATPR POG DURMC DURCP
RELIGFRAC .369 .222 1 ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
ETHNOFRAC .304 .204 .083 1 ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
LINGOFRAC .269 .215 .248 .704 1 ... ... ... ... ... ...
AV GCONFL. 18.3 23.8 .020 −.275 −.234 1 ... ... ... ... ...
MUSCHRCO 3.35 5.69 −.128 −.031 −.128 .356 1 ... ... ... ...
CATPROCO .731 2.38 .133 −.203 −.170 .478 −.185 1 ... ... ...
POGROM .096 .358 .038 −.059 .010 .310 −.031 .236 1 ... ...
DURMUSCH 1.73 2.18 −.124 .003 −.148 −.169 .299 −.231 −.185 1 ...
DURCATPRO .478 1.93 .230 −.093 −.066 .120 −.131 .496 −.022 −.093 1
DURPOGRO .025 .140 .142 −.012 .107 −.022 −.093 .024 .499 −.146 −.035
1400 CE — 1900 CE The Correlation Matrix
n =5 2 Mean St. Dev. RELG ETHN LING YR CON YR MSCH YR CTPR YR POG ME BALK
RELFRAC .369 .222 1 ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
ETHNFRAC .304 .204 .083 1 ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
LINGFRAC .269 .215 .168 .671 1 ... ... ... ... ... ...
YR . CONF. 1644 99.4 .147 −.172 −.008 1 ... ... ... ... ...
YR . MUSCH 934.8 811.2 −.074 −.068 −.097 .387 1 ... ... ... ...
YR . CA TPR O 210.8 539.8 .195 −.212 −.139 .095 −.310 1 ... ... ...
YR . POG R . 115.4 404.5 .043 −.124 −.025 .067 −.168 .093 1 ... ...
MIDEAST .212 .412 −.034 .131 −.020 .063 .079 −.176 −.129 1 ...
BALKANS .115 .323 .093 .049 −.105 .148 .328 −.131 −.096 −.162 1
EASTEU .096 .298 .243 −.093 −.008 −.035 .216 −.041 .070 −.217 −.162Table 2: Continued
1400 CE — 1900 CE The Correlation Matrix
n =5 2 Mean St. Dev. RELIG ETHN LING EQU ROME JERUS MECCA CHRSM MUSMAJ
RELIGFRAC .369 .222 1 ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
ETHNOFRAC .304 .204 .087 1 ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
LINGOFRAC .269 .215 .296 .688 1 ... ... ... ... ... ...
EQUATOR 42.7 11.0 .309 −.219 .010 1 ... ... ... ... ...
ROME 1093 663.7 −.095 .231 .255 −.337 1 ... ... ... ...
JERUS. 1951 763.3 −.035 −.093 −.002 .557 −.172 1 ... ... ...
MECCA 1368 650.0 .073 −.121 −.004 .709 −.344 .904 1 ... ...
CHRMAJOR .635 .486 −.438 .153 −.126 −.665 .302 −.384 −.499 1 ...
MUSMAJOR .269 .448 .245 −.285 −.111 .703 −.401 .483 .568 −.780 1
POLITY94 5.02 6.02 .231 −.446 −.128 .650 −.440 .357 .475 −.684 .747Table 3: Impact of Conﬂicts on Religious Fractionalization (1400 — 1900 CE)
Dependent Variable: Religious Fractionalization
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TOTALCONFLICTS .0008 −.001 .0002 .003
(.002) (.003) (.006) (.007)
MUSLIMCHRISTIAN −.016∗∗ −.020∗ −.019∗∗ −.022∗∗
(.008) (.007) (.010) (.011)
PROTESTCATHOLIC .002 −.0005 .002 .028
(.016) (.018) (.035) (.051)
POGROM .117 .218 .329 .682∗
(.153) (.161) (.199) (.240)
DURCONFLICTS .053∗ .054∗ .062∗∗ .053
(.025) (.026) (.032) (.034)
DURMUSLIMCHRIST −.031 −.033∗∗ −.039 −.027
(.021) (.019) (.025) (.029)
DURPROTESTCATH .006 .003 .008 .012
(.011) (.010) (.011) (.025)
DURPOGROM −.191 −.347 −.623∗ −.136
(.246) (.228) (.285) (.576)
BALKANS .532∗ .509∗ .333 .416∗∗
(.075) (.129) (.213) (.232)
EASTERNEU .513∗ .422∗∗ .204 .296
(.092) (.239) (.329) (.383)
MIDEAST .250∗ .253∗ −.014 .040
(.063) (.070) (.192) (.218)
AFRICA .013 −.219 .114 .585
(.067) (.237) (.343) (1.16)
LANDAREA ... .00001 .00002 .00003
(.00001) (.00003) (.00003)
MUSLIMAJOR ... ... −.130 −.149
(.184) (.251)
CHRISTIANMAJOR ... ... −.147 −.122
(.135) (.178)
R2 .439 .478 .586 .616
No. of obs. 52 52 52 52
Note: * and ** respectively denote signiﬁcance at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels. Dependent variable: religious
fractionalization in 2001; source: Alesina et al. (2003). Source of conﬂict data: Brecke (1999). Source of population data:
McEvedy and Jones (1978). Geographic dummy variables WESTERNEU, CENTRALEU, ISLAND, NORTHERNEU
included in all regressions but now shown. POPULATION, EQUATOR, LANDLOCK included in columns (2) through
(4) but not shown. POP1000, POP1500, ROME, JERUSALEM, MECCA included in columns (3) and (4) but not shown.
YRCONFLICT, YRMUSLIMCHRIST, YRPROTESTCATH and YRPOGROM included in column (4) but not shown.
40Table 4: Impact of Conﬂicts on Ethnic Fractionalization (1400 — 1900 CE)
Dependent Variable: Ethnic Fractionalization
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TOTALCONFLICTS −.0026∗∗ −.0026 .0011 .0091
(.0015) (.0021) (.0056) (.0099)
MUSLIMCHRISTIAN −.0010 −.0063 −.015 −.024
(.0072) (.0087) (.012) (.015)
PROTESTCATHOLIC −.0001 −.0029 .008 .079
(.011) (.013) (.027) (.069)
POGROM .152 .197 .138 .641∗
(.134) (.153) (.200) (.263)
DURCONFLICTS .029 .048∗∗ .038 .021
(.025) (.028) (.034) (.037)
DURMUSLIMCHRIST −.037∗ −.051∗ −.041 −.023
(.017) (.019) (.026) (.030)
DURPROTESTCATH −.010 −.012 −.007 .014
(.013) (.013) (.015) (.028)
DURPOGROM −.314 −.435∗∗ −.511 .250
(.209) (.238) (.370) (.741)
BALKANS −.002 .127 .181 .290
(.231) (.275) (.367) (.402)
EASTERNEU −.039 −.076 .080 .111
(.239) (.290) (.429) (.495)
MIDEAST −.039 −.026 −.405 −.307
(.242) (.234) (.391) (.449)
AFRICA .443 .468 .466 .962
(.276) (.344) (.476) (1.20)
LANDAREA ... .00003∗∗ .00002 .00004
(.000015) (.00002) (.00003)
MUSLIMAJOR ... ... −.093 −.119
(.161) (.221)
CHRISTIANMAJOR ... ... −.113 −.090
(.149) (.189)
R2 .265 .328 .428 .510
No. of obs. 50 50 50 50
Note: * and ** respectively denote signiﬁcance at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels. Dependent variable: religious
fractionalization in 2001; source: Alesina et al. (2003). Source of conﬂict data: Brecke (1999). Source of population data:
McEvedy and Jones (1978). Geographic dummy variables WESTERNEU, CENTRALEU, ISLAND, NORTHERNEU
included in all regressions but now shown. POPULATION, EQUATOR, LANDLOCK included in columns (2) through
(4) but not shown. POP1000, POP1500, ROME, JERUSALEM, MECCA included in columns (3) and (4) but not shown.
YRCONFLICT, YRMUSLIMCHRIST, YRPROTESTCATH and YRPOGROM included in column (4) but not shown.
41Table 5: Impact of Conﬂicts on Linguistic Fractionalization (1400 — 1900 CE)
Dependent Variable: Linguistic Fractionalization
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TOTALCONFLICTS −.0031∗∗ −.0037∗∗ −.0012 .0075
(.0017) (.0022) (.0050) (.0089)
MUSLIMCHRISTIAN .0043 .0003 −.0077 −.021
(.0089) (.010) (.010) (.013)
PROTESTCATHOLIC −.0064 −.014 .0087 .077
(.015) (.019) (.030) (.060)
POGROM .041 .143 .138 .414
(.097) (.137) (.175) (.243)
DURCONFLICTS .043 .060∗ .052 .019
(.027) (.030) (.038) (.033)
DURMUSLIMCHRIST −.024 −.037 −.039 −.023
(.020) (.024) (.034) (.032)
DURPROTESTCATH −.0046 −.008 −.0035 .016
(.015) (.018) (.019) (.028)
DURPOGROM .030 −.186 −.558 .197
(.211) (.163) (.407) (.584)
BALKANS .050 .073 .039 .063
(.183) (.226) (.267) (.290)
EASTERNEU .155 −.043 .090 −.064
(.151) (.234) (.313) (.362)
MIDEAST .112 .113 −.525∗ −.414
(.133) (.124) (.232) (.334)
AFRICA .125 −.072 .247 .604
(.135) (.258) (.352) (1.05)
LANDAREA ... .00002 .00002 .00003
(.00002) (.00002) (.00003)
MUSLIMAJOR ... ... −.297∗∗ −.364∗
(.179) (.145)
CHRISTIANMAJOR ... ... −.296 −.343∗
(.179) (.157)
R2 .245 .311 .562 .675
No. of obs. 52 52 52 52
Note: * and ** respectively denote signiﬁcance at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels. Dependent variable: religious
fractionalization in 2001; source: Alesina et al. (2003). Source of conﬂict data: Brecke (1999). Source of population data:
McEvedy and Jones (1978). Geographic dummy variables WESTERNEU, CENTRALEU, ISLAND, NORTHERNEU
included in all regressions but now shown. POPULATION, EQUATOR, LANDLOCK included in columns (2) through
(4) but not shown. POP1000, POP1500, ROME, JERUSALEM, MECCA included in columns (3) and (4) but not shown.
YRCONFLICT, YRMUSLIMCHRIST, YRPROTESTCATH and YRPOGROM included in column (4) but not shown.
42Table 6: Impact of Conﬂicts on Religious Fractionalization (1400 — 1600 CE)
Dependent Variable: Religious Fractionalization
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TOTALCONFLICTS −.0003 −.002 .0003 .007
(.003) (.003) (.007) (.006)
MUSLIMCHRISTIAN −.022 −.026 −.025 −.033∗∗
(.016) (.017) (.024) (.018)
PROTESTCATHOLIC .047∗ .049∗∗ .063∗ .355∗
(.021) (.023) (.035) (.072)
POGROM .531∗ .589∗∗∗ .683∗∗ 1.64∗
(.154) (.155) (.168) (.300)
DURCONFLICTS .016 .012 .013 −.028
(.011) (.012) (.012) (.021)
DURMUSLIMCHRIST −.010 −.002 .006 .043
(.017) (.015) (.021) (.027)
DURPROTESTCATH −.005 −.0001 .009 .001
(.018) (.017) (.021) (.025)
DURPOGROM −9.48∗ −9.68∗ −9.57∗ −385.3∗
(3.62) (3.63) (3.767) (72.16)
BALKANS .444∗ .415∗ .275 .019
(.070) (.136) (.230) (.330)
EASTERNEU .462∗ .423∗∗ .328 .077
(.069) (.172) (.336) (.382)
MIDEAST .212∗ .224∗ .124 −.174
(.088) (.099) (.217) (.244)
AFRICA −.080 −.061 .236 .360∗
(.071) (.254) (.274) (.454)
LANDAREA ... .00000001 .00000002 .00000002
(.00000001) (.00000002) (.00000002)
MUSLIMAJOR ... ... −.179 −.363∗∗
(.178) (.187)
CHRISTIANMAJOR ... ... −.142 −.278∗
(.117) (.132)
R2 .455 .474 .600 .754
No. of obs. 52 52 52 52
Note: * and ** respectively denote signiﬁcance at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels. Dependent variable: religious
fractionalization in 2001; source: Alesina et al. (2003). Source of conﬂict data: Brecke (1999). Source of population data:
McEvedy and Jones (1978). Geographic dummy variables WESTERNEU, CENTRALEU, ISLAND, NORTHERNEU
included in all regressions but not shown. POPULATION, EQUATOR, LANDLOCK included in columns (2) through
(4) but not shown. POP1000, POP1500, ROME, JERUSALEM, MECCA included in columns (3) and (4) but not shown.
YRCONFLICT, YRMUSLIMCHRIST, YRPROTESTCATH and YRPOGROM included in column (4) but not shown.
43Table 7: Impact of Conﬂicts on Ethnic Fractionalization (1400 — 1600 CE)
Dependent Variable: Ethnic Fractionalization
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TOTALCONFLICTS −.005∗∗ −.004 .003 .012
(.002) (.003) (.007) (.011)
MUSLIMCHRISTIAN .003 −.007 −.019 −.036
(.021) (.020) (.026) (.025)
PROTESTCATHOLIC .022 .020 .031 .111
(.017) (.019) (.052) (.107)
POGROM .411∗ .467∗ .400∗ .667
(.087) (.139) (.189) (.432)
DURCONFLICTS .016 .026∗∗ .020 −.016
(.015) (.014) (.017) (.035)
DURMUSLIMCHRIST −.003 −.014 −.002 .032
(.018) (.021) (.026) (.044)
DURPROTESTCATH −.003 −.006 .001 .077∗
(.014) (.014) (.018) (.036)
DURPOGROM −6.62∗ −7.67∗ −7.07∗∗ −8.27
(2.49) (3.366) (3.832) (118.5)
BALKANS −.047 .074 .155 −.031
(.220) (.247) (.310) (.452)
EASTERNEU −.079 −.114 .093 −.084
(.219) (.266) (.358) (.484)
MIDEAST .003 −.002 −.237 −.202
(.242) (.231) (.329) (.403)
AFRICA .360 .481 .464 −.090
(.241) (.353) (.400) (.541)
LANDAREA ... .00000003 .00000002 .00000003
(.0000002) (.00000002) (.0000002)
MUSLIMAJOR ... ... −.094 −.257
(.178) (.174)
CHRISTIANMAJOR ... ... −.077 −.153
(.123) (.137)
R2 .267 .329 .444 .580
No. of obs. 50 50 50 50
Note: * and ** respectively denote signiﬁcance at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels. Dependent variable: religious
fractionalization in 2001; source: Alesina et al. (2003). Source of conﬂict data: Brecke (1999). Source of population data:
McEvedy and Jones (1978). Geographic dummy variables WESTERNEU, CENTRALEU, ISLAND, NORTHERNEU
included in all regressions but not shown. POPULATION, EQUATOR, LANDLOCK included in columns (2) through
(4) but not shown. POP1000, POP1500, ROME, JERUSALEM, MECCA included in columns (3) and (4) but not shown.
YRCONFLICT, YRMUSLIMCHRIST, YRPROTESTCATH and YRPOGROM included in column (4) but not shown.
44Table 8: Impact of Conﬂicts on Linguistic Fractionalization (1400 — 1600 CE)
Dependent Variable: Linguistic Fractionalization
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TOTALCONFLICTS −.006∗ −.007∗∗∗ −.0006 .0007
(.002) (.004) (.006) (.008)
MUSLIMCHRISTIAN .003 −.004 −.007 −.037∗∗
(.019) (.024) (.022) (.022)
PROTESTCATHOLIC .025 .019 .055 .049
(.020) (.025) (.044) (.097)
POGROM .396∗∗ .453∗∗ .390∗ .356∗
(.115) (.192) (.192) (.372)
DURCONFLICTS .015 .024 .017 −.002
(.013) (.015) (.019) (.030)
DURMUSLIMCHRIST −.0008 −.010 −.003 .014
(.021) (.026) (.032) (.036)
DURPROTESTCATH .00006 −.0002 .015 .084
(.016) (.016) (.017) (.036)
DURPOGROM −8.43∗ −8.67∗ −7.54∗ −94.81
(2.00) (3.210) (2.848) (117.67)
BALKANS .025 .046 .155 −.015
(.177) (.231) (.266) (.292)
EASTERNEU .143 −.040 .150 .150
(.132) (.245) (.227) (.281)
MIDEAST .124∗∗ .116 −.393 −.316
(.145) (.169) (.222) (.294)
AFRICA .128 −.191 .316 −.121
(.151) (.171) (.289) (.413)
LANDAREA ... .0000002 .00000003 .00000003
(.000002) (.00000002) (.00000002)
MUSLIMAJOR ... ... −.326∗ −.400∗
(.172) (.181)
CHRISTIANMAJOR ... ... −.251∗∗ −.299∗∗
(.145) (.151)
R2 .223 .315 .592 .690
No. of obs. 52 52 52 52
Note: * and ** respectively denote signiﬁcance at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels. Dependent variable: religious
fractionalization in 2001; source: Alesina et al. (2003). Source of conﬂict data: Brecke (1999). Source of population data:
McEvedy and Jones (1978). Geographic dummy variables WESTERNEU, CENTRALEU, ISLAND, NORTHERNEU
included in all regressions but not shown. POPULATION, EQUATOR, LANDLOCK included in columns (2) through
(4) but not shown. POP1000, POP1500, ROME, JERUSALEM, MECCA included in columns (3) and (4) but not shown.
YRCONFLICT, YRMUSLIMCHRIST, YRPROTESTCATH and YRPOGROM included in column (4) but not shown.
45Table 9.A: Three-Stage OLS IV Estimates (1400 — 1900 CE Conﬂict Data)
Dep. Var.: Economic Growth (1970-2002)
(1) (2) (3)
RELICFRAC −3.75∗ −2.80 −3.24∗∗
(2.26) (1.79) (1.79)
ETHNOFRAC ... −4.17∗ −3.23∗
(.990) (1.38)
LINGOFRAC ... ... −.753
(.961)
GDP/CAPITA(1970) −.00047∗∗ −.00043∗ −.0004
(.00027) (.00022) (.00022)
POPGROW(1970) −.624∗∗ −.550∗ −.534∗
(.336) (.264) (.261)
INV/GDP(1970) .046 .047∗∗ .049∗∗
(.036) (.028) (.029)
OPENNESS(1970) .00045 −.0073 −.0068
(.0128) (.0104) (.010)
PRIMARYSCHOOL(1970) −.0034 −.036∗∗ −.040∗
(.023) (.020) (.020)
BALKANS .464 −.116 −.189
(.933) (.773) (.768)
EASTERNEU 1.18 .107 .217
(1.12) (.942) (.920)
MIDEAST .876 1.32∗ 1.27∗
(.711) (.590) (.582)
AFRICA 2.27 6.38∗ 6.38∗
(2.49) (2.24) (2.20)
LANDAREA −.0066 −.0020 −.0021
(.0066) (.0055) (.0054)
LANDLOCKED −.351 −.050 −.109
(.691) (.563) (.560)
ISLAND 4.00∗ 3.32∗ 3.24∗
(1.33) (1.11) (1.09)
R2 .833 .864 .879
No. of obs. 30 30 30
Note: * and ** respectively denote signiﬁcance at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels. Dependent variable: religious
fractionalization in 2001; source: Alesina et al. (2003). Source of conﬂict data: Brecke (1999). Source of population data:
McEvedy and Jones (1978). Geographic dummy variables WESTERNEU, CENTRALEU, NORTHERNEU included in
all regressions but not shown.
46Table 9.B: Three-Stage OLS IV Estimates (1400 — 1900 CE Conﬂict Data)
Dependent Variables: Religious Fractionalization in (1), (2.a) and (3.a)
Ethnic Fractionalization in (2.b) and (3.b)
Linguistic Fractionalization in (3.c)
2nd Stage RELI. RELI. ETHN. RELI. ETHN. LINGF.
(1) (2.a) (2.b) (3.a) (3.b) (3.c)
MUSLIMCHRIST. −.019∗∗ −.021∗ .0018 −.020∗ .0013 −.0009
(.010) (.010) (.011) (.010) (.011) (.014)
PROTESTCATH. .033∗ .030∗ −.025∗∗ .030∗ −.026∗∗ −.020
(.014) (.013) (.014) (.014) (.014) (.018)
MIDEAST .282∗ .282∗ .091 .283∗ .091 −.039
(.096) (.096) (.099) (.096) (.099) (.124)
BALKANS .436∗∗ .460∗ −.244 .454∗∗ −.235 −.369
(.251) (.249) (.262) (.249) (.262) (.326)
EASTERNEU .257 .250 −.495∗ .251 −.493∗ −.496∗∗
(.221) (.220) (.231) (.220) (.231) (.288)
EQUATOR .012 .013 .016∗∗ .012 .017∗∗ .020∗∗
(.009) (.086) (.009) (.009) (.009) (.011)
ISLAND −.269 −.271 −.315 −.265 −.318 −.508∗∗
(.235) (.235) (.244) (.235) (.244) (.303)
LANDAREA .002 .002 −.00004 .0017 .00003 .0004
(.002) (.002) (.0015) (.0014) (.002) (.002)
LANDLOCKED .160 .162 .217∗∗ .163 .216∗∗ .069
(.108) (.108) (.115) (.108) (.115) (.143)
R2 .515 .526 .436 .525 .436 .272
F statistic 3.52 3.55 1.71 3.53 1.71 .744
No. of obs. 30 30 30 30 30 30
Note: * and ** respectively denote signiﬁcance at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels. Dependent variables: religious,
ethnic and linguistic fractionalization in 2001; source: Alesina et al. (2003). Source of conﬂict data: Brecke (1999).
WESTERNEU, CENTRALEU, NORTHERNEU, AFRICA and POPULATION included but not shown.
47Table 9.C: Three-Stage OLS IV Estimates (1400 — 1900 CE Conﬂict Data)
1st Stage Dep. Var.: MUSLIMCHRISTIAN
(1) (2) (3)
ROME −.087∗ −.087∗ −.088∗
(.013) (.013) (.013)
JERUSALEM .023∗ .022∗ .022∗
(.0055) (.0055) (.0055)
MECCA −.113∗ −.113∗ −.115∗
(.020) (.019) (.019)
ROME − JER 90.8∗ 90.3∗ 91.3∗
(16.7) (16.6) (16.6)
JER− MECC .000026∗ .000027∗ .000027∗
(.000005) (.000005) (.000005)
ROME − MECC .000085∗ .000086∗ .000087∗
(.000013) (.000013) (.000013)
RM − JE− ME −.0026∗ −.0026∗ −.0026∗
(.00043) (.00042) (.00042)
BALKANS 19.4∗ 19.7∗ 19.6∗
(2.38) (2.37) (2.37)
EASTERNEU 10.5∗ 10.5∗ 10.5∗
(1.67) (1.67) (1.67)
R2 .877 .877 .877
F statistic 9.96 10.05 10.12
Note: * and ** respectively denote signiﬁcance at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels. Source of conﬂict data: Brecke
(1999). Duration of Muslim-Christian and Protestant-Catholic wars also predicted in the 1st stage, but not shown.
48Table 9.C: (Continued)
1st Stage Dep. Var.: PROTESTANTCATHOLICW.
(1) (2) (3)
ROME −.0017 −.0036 −.0017
(.013) (.013) (.013)
JERUSALEM −.005 −.006 −.005
(.005) (.005) (.005)
MECCA −.0050 −.006 −.005
(.019) (.019) (.019)
ROME − JER −4.37 −3.63 −5.02
(16.5) (16.4) (16.4)
JER− MECC .000006 .000007 .000006
(.000005) (.000005) (.000005)
ROME − MECC .000007 .000008 .000007
(.000013) (.000013) (.000013)
RM − JE− ME −.0044 −.0047 −.0045
(.0042) (.0042) (.0042)
BALKANS 1.78 1.70 1.82
(2.35) (2.35) (2.34)
EASTERNEU −.459 −.361 −.465
(1.65) (1.65) (1.65)
R2 .307 .299 .305
F statistic .580 .621 .581
Note: * and ** respectively denote signiﬁcance at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels. Source of conﬂict data: Brecke
(1999). Duration of Muslim-Christian and Protestant-Catholic wars also predicted in the 1st stage, but not shown.
49Table 10: Impact of Conﬂicts on Polity Scores in 1994 (1400 — 1900 CE)
Dependent Variable: 1994 Polity Scores
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TOTALCONFLICTS −.036 .054 −.040 −.334
(.053) (.042) (.126) (.213)
MUSLIMCHRISTIAN .414 .913∗ 1.134∗ 1.570∗
(.324) (.227) (.507) (.712)
PROTESTCATHOLIC −.085 −.223 −.329 1.550
(.254) (.303) (.737) (1.608)
POGROM −1.09 −7.01∗ −5.46 −2.42
(2.11) (1.99) (3.97) (5.61)
DURCONFLICTS .188 .095 .135 −.421
(.352) (.354) (.262) (.385)
DURMUSLIMCHRIST −.457 −.440 −.474 −.804
(.373) (.350) (.511) (.543)
DURPROTESTCATH .491∗ .342∗ −2.40∗∗ −.103
(.239) (.256) (.377) (1.253)
DURPOGROM 13.22 95.58∗ 77.21 −4319.2∗∗
(25.12) (35.06) (57.01) (2255.3)
BALKANS 7.62 3.369 −.110 −2.22
(3.206) (3.533) (5.186) (6.289)
EASTERNEU 12.022∗ 9.822∗ 4.751 6.592
(2.836) (3.851) (5.490) (5.833)
MIDEAST 3.891 −1.609 8.553 10.948
(3.547) (3.730) (6.239) (7.312)
AFRICA −4.319 −5.547 −.964 4.238
(3.203) (3.920) (6.447) (8.420)
LANDAREA ... −.0000009∗ −.0000009∗ −.000001
(.0000002) (.0000004) (.0000004)
MUSLIMAJOR ... ... −.826 −3.361
(2.503) (4.681)
CHRISTIANMAJOR ... ... 2.957 −1.391
(3.282) (4.524)
R2 .660 .767 .826 .873
No. of obs. 49 49 49 49
Note: * and ** respectively denote signiﬁcance at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels. Dependent variable: religious
fractionalization in 2001; source: Alesina et al. (2003). Source of conﬂict data: Brecke (1999). Source of population data:
McEvedy and Jones (1978). Geographic dummy variables WESTERNEU, CENTRALEU, ISLAND, NORTHERNEU
included in all regressions but not shown. POPULATION, EQUATOR, LANDLOCK included in columns (2) through
(4) but not shown. POP1000, POP1500, ROME, JERUSALEM, MECCA included in columns (3) and (4) but not shown.
YRCONFLICT, YRMUSLIMCHRIST, YRPROTESTCATH and YRPOGROM included in column (4) but not shown.
50Table 11: Impact of Conﬂicts versus Fractionalization on Polity Sc. (1400 — 1900 CE)
Dependent Variable: 1994 Polity Scores
(1) (2) (3) (4)
RELIGIOUSFRAC 1.689 1.011 −3.358 1.679
(3.524) (2.830) (4.849) (4.286)
ETHNOFRAC −10.32∗ −8.316∗ −7.452∗ −2.377
(4.669) (3.991) (3.323) (5.193)
LINGOFRAC −0.704 .907 3.728 −2.267
(5.489) (4.182) (4.860) (6.574)
TOTALCONFLICTS −.0452 .025 −.026 −.115
(.034) (.025) (.069) (.109)
MUSLIMCHRISTIAN .154 .394∗ .422 −.115
(.171) (.159) (.292) (.326)
PROTESTCATHOLIC .037 −.014 −.138 −.969
(.206) (.159) (.428) (.729)
POGROM 2.931 .042 .973 −10.879∗
(2.249) (2.095) (3.194) (5.755)
DURCONFLICTS 1.128 .498 .549 .385
(.717) (.604) (.735) (.828)
DURMUSLIMCHRIST −.426 −.052 −.274 −.570
(.429) (.463) (.730) (.696)
DURPROTESTCATH .070 .209 .210 −.127
(.200) (.128) (.190) (.342)
DURPOGROM −4.737 −.402 1.798 −2.212
(3.774) (3.904) (6.662) (11.151)
AFRICA −2.643∗ −4.639 .531 −22.156
(4.520) (4.034) (5.99) (23.30)
LANDAREA ... .0000008∗ .0000006 −.000001∗∗
(.0000002) (.0000004) (.0000005)
MUSLIMAJOR ... ... −.322 −1.281
(2.847) (4.782)
CHRISTIANMAJOR ... ... 2.631 .561
(3.784) (6.803)
R2 .764 .818 .859 .909
No. of obs. 48 48 48 48
Note: * and ** respectively denote signiﬁcance at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels. Dependent variable: religious
fractionalization in 2001; source: Alesina et al. (2003). Source of conﬂict data: Brecke (1999). Source of population data:
McEvedy and Jones (1978). Geographic dummy variables WESTERNEU, CENTRALEU, NORTHERNEU, ISLAND,
BALKANS, MIDDLEAST included in all regressions but not shown. POPULATION, EQUATOR, LANDLOCK included
in columns (2) through (4) but not shown. POP1000, POP1500, ROME, JERUSALEM, MECCA included in columns
(3) and (4) but not shown. YRCONFLICT, YRMUSLIMCHRIST, YRPROTESTCATH and YRPOGROM included in
c o l u m n( 4 )b u tn o ts h o w n .
51